Beverly J. Wade
v.
John Hurley, Director of
Colorado Division of Employment; Industrial
Commission
of the State of Colorado (Ex-Officio Unemployment
Compensation Commission of Colorado); H.R. and Gretta Barker,
d/b/a Ma's
Hash House; and Donald H. Farnham
d/b/a Ma's Hash House
No. 73-108
33 Colo. App. 30, 515 P.2d
491
Colorado
Court of Appeals,
Div. I.
September 5, 1973
William E. Benjamin, for petitioner.
John E. Moore, Attorney General, John E. Bush, Deputy, Robert L.
Harris, Assistant, for respondents.
PIERCE, Judge.
Claimant was employed as a cook by Ma's Hash House. Upon being
separated from her employment, she filed a claim for unemployment
compensation benefits with the Industrial Commission. After a
hearing, a referee concluded, among other findings, that claimant's
unemployment was a result of her quitting because of dissatisfaction
with the prevailing standard hours of work common to other workers
performing the same or similar work, and thus, under 1965 Perm.
Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 82-4-8 (6)(b)(i), she was entitled to no award
of benefits. Upon review, the Industrial Commission adopted the
referee's findings of fact and conclusions and entered an order
affirming her decision. Claimaint appeals, and we reverse.
Her principal contention is that she terminated her employment
because the employer violated its employment contract with her and
that, therefore, she is entitled to a full award of benefits under
the provisions of 1965 Perm. Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 82-4-8(4)(i). She
then concludes that the Commission erred in applying 1965 Perm.
Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 82-4-8(6)(b)(i), to the facts of this case when
the proper section of the statute to be applied is 1965 Perm. Supp.,
C.R.S. 1963, 82-4-8(4)(i), or at very least, 1971 Perm. Supp., C.R.S.
1963, 82-4-8(5)(d), which section provides for a 50% award when the
responsibility for the separation is shared by the employer and the
employee.
Although the testimony was in some conflict regarding the
contractual arrangements between the parties, the referee
specifically found "[claimant] entered into a verbal agreement with
Mr. Barker that she would work as a roll-and-pie cook from 5:30 a.m.
until noon on a five-day-per-week basis, but that she would not work
Saturdays." The resolution of this factual issue was within the
province of the Commission and where there is substantial evidence
to support this finding, we will not disturb it on review.
Morrison Road Bar, Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 138 Colo. 16,
328 P.2d 1076.
The Commission's findings also indicate that, because the
employer had difficulty finding sufficient help, the claimant was
soon working almost every Saturday. There are no findings, however,
to the effect that the original contract was ever modified by the
parties or that claimant had agreed to waive the original provisions
of the contract as to working hours.
The facts are not in dispute that, just prior to claimant's
separation from her employment, her husband had appeared at the
employer's place of business and informed the employer that claimant
would not continue to work a six-day week. The employer contacted
claimant and requested that she return to work on a six-day-a-week
basis, but claimant refused and terminated her employment.
With this factual background, the Commission found:
"The issue in the case is not whether or
not the claimant and employer had an agreement that her
employment would not exceed five days per week. It is well
established that it is an employer's prerogative to set
business hours and working schedules, and it is also well
known that restaurant employees customarily work on
Saturdays. When the employer discovered he needed a cook on
a six-day-per-week basis and told the claimant he could no
longer continue her on the five-day basis, she had every
right to resign if she found this condition unacceptable. It
does not follow that she is entitled to an award of benefits
for this separation."
These conclusions are erroneous.
While it is true an employer has the prerogative of setting
business hours and working schedules in the absence of a specific
agreement between employer and employee to the contrary, a contract
limiting the working hours to fewer than those which generally
prevail for others doing the same or similar work cannot be ignored.
See Redmond v. Industrial Commission, 32 Colo. App. 134, 509
P.2d 1277. The "custom" of the trade is no longer relevant since the
parties have departed from it of their own accord.
Where, as found here, there is a contract between the parties
specifying a five-day work week and where, thereafter, the employer
causes the employee to resign by unilaterally changing the number of
days in the work week, the employee is entitled to a full award of
benefits under the provisions of 1965 Perm. Supp., C.R.S. 1963,
82-4-8(4)(i).
Order is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings
not inconsistent with this opinion.
Chief Judge Silverstein and Judge Enoch concur.