Shirley Wargon, Petitioner,
v.
The Industrial Claim
Appeals Office of the State of
Colorado, and Alta Mode, Inc., Respondents.
No. 89CA1108.
787 P.2d 668
Colorado Court of Appeals,
Div. II.
Jan. 25, 1990.
Eric J. Pringle, Denver, for petitioner.
Duane Woodard, Atty. Gen., Charles B. Howe, Chief Deputy Atty.
Gen., Richard H. Forman, Sol. Gen., and Carol A. Finley, Asst. Atty.
Gen., Denver, for respondent Indus. Claim Appeals Office.
Robert A. Calvert, Denver, for respondent Alta Mode, Inc.
DAVIDSON, Judge.
Claimant, Shirley Wargon, seeks review of a final order of the
Industrial Claim Appeals Office (Panel) which disqualified her from
the receipt of benefits. We set aside the order and remand with
directions.
Claimant was employed by respondent Alta Mode, Inc., as a
clothing store salesperson from August 1987 through March 29, 1988.
She was the only non-owner salesperson. Pursuant to her verbal
hiring agreement, claimant's monthly compensation was a base salary
of $1500 plus a bonus of $200. Claimant testified she quit a retail
clothing sales job where her compensation was based on a commission
to accept this job mainly because she wanted the stability and
security of a monthly salary.
On March 29, 1988, one of the owners informed claimant that
beginning April 1, 1988, her compensation structure would be
changed. Instead of receiving a base monthly salary plus bonuses,
claimant would be compensated strictly on commission. She would
receive a 10 per cent commission on her sales plus her bonus.
Claimant resigned the next day citing the change in compensation
structure.
Based on evidence presented by employer concerning claimant's
sales, the hearing officer found that the new method of compensation
would not result in a substantial reduction in claimant's income. He
further found that the new method of paying wages was "substantially
fair" and that claimant did not act reasonably in refusing to accept
it. Consequently, the hearing officer disqualified claimant from the
receipt of benefits pursuant to § 8-73-108(5)(e)(I), C.R.S. (1986
Repl. Vol. 3B) (quitting because of dissatisfaction with standard
working conditions). The Panel affirmed the order.
On review, claimant contends that the Panel erred in applying
§
8-73-108(5)(e)(I) because claimant's separation from employment
followed a change in job duties. We agree.
Section 8-73-108(5)(e)(I) provides that an employee is
disqualified from receiving benefits if the employee quits because
of dissatisfaction with "standard working conditions." However, a
finding that a claimant quit because of dissatisfaction with
standard working conditions is proper only when there has been no
substantial change in claimant's work environment, duties, and
conditions. Martinez v. Industrial Commission, 657 P.2d 457 (Colo.
App.1982).
Here, there was a change in claimant's working conditions
immediately prior to her resignation. The Panel has interpreted the
hearing officer's findings as implicit determinations that
claimant's new wage method did not constitute a substantial change
in claimant's working conditions, or that it at least did not result
in conditions substantially less favorable to claimant. From our
reading of the order, we conclude that, although the hearing
officer's findings addressed the applicability of
§
8-73-108(5)(e)(VI), they did not correctly address the applicability
of § 8-73-108(4)(d) C.R.S. (1986 Repl. Vol. 3B).
Section 8-73-108(4)(d) provides for a full award of benefits if a
claimant resigns because of a substantial change in working
conditions, if those conditions become substantially less favorable
to the claimant. Accordingly, we must determine first whether a
change in method of compensation from salary to commission is a
substantial change and, if so, whether that change is substantially
less favorable to the claimant.
Whether a change in working conditions constitutes a
substantial change and, if so, whether the substantial change is
substantially less favorable to the worker must be judged by an
objective standard rather than by a claimant's subjective outlook.
Consequently, in assessing the evidence, the issue is whether a
reasonable employee in claimant's position would find the change in
working conditions to be not only substantial, but also
substantially less favorable. See Rose Medical Center Hospital v.
Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 757 P.2d 1173 (Colo. App.1988);
Action Key Punch Service, Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 709 P.2d
970 (Colo. App.1985); Gatewood v. Russell, 29 Colo. App. 11, 478
P.2d 679 (1970).
A change in duties or a demotion may be a change in working
conditions that is substantially less favorable, Martinez v.
Industrial Commission, supra., as may be a situation in which a
claimant has been relieved of administrative or supervisory
responsibilities, Warburton v. Industrial Commission, 678 P.2d 1076
(Colo. App.1984), or has had her salary reduced. See Musgrave v. Eben Ezer Lutheran Institute, 731 P.2d 142 (Colo. App.1986).
Furthermore, intangible factors may adversely affect a work
environment or working conditions. See Gray Moving & Storage, Inc.
v. Industrial Commission, 38 Colo. App. 419, 560 P.2d 482 (1976)
(ostracism may evidence a substantial change in working conditions).
Similarly, being paid on a commission rather than on a salary can
generate increased risk, responsibility, and stress for a reasonable
employee in claimant's position. We therefore hold that a change in
the method of compensation from a salary plus bonus to a commission
plus bonus constitutes a substantial change in claimant's working
conditions as a matter of law.
Furthermore, we conclude that, to a reasonable employee in
claimant's position, the planned modification in her compensation
would constitute a substantially less favorable change in working
conditions.
The hearing officer concluded that the new compensation
method would not result in a substantial reduction in claimant's
income and, therefore, did not result in an unfavorable change in
working conditions. However, the amount of compensation an employee
receives is only one factor of many which may be considered in
evaluating work environment or conditions, and was not the critical
factor in evaluating the impact of the job change on claimant.
Because of the possibly greater security of a salaried job, many
employees, including claimant, consider it preferable to be paid in
that manner. In fact, claimant left a commissioned job to work for
this employer primarily because she wanted the security and
stability of a salary. In explaining her dissatisfaction with a
commission, claimant referred to the resultant fluctuation and the
unpredictability of monthly income, the increased competition among
the sales force, and increased job pressure. We therefore conclude
that, as a matter of law, to a reasonable person in claimant's
position, the change in compensation method from salary to
commission constituted a substantially less favorable change in
working conditions.
The order is set aside, and the cause is remanded to the
Industrial Claim Appeals Office with directions to award claimant
full benefits pursuant to § 8-73-108(4)(d), C.R.S. (1986 Repl. Vol.
3B).
Smith and Tursi, JJ., concur.