Joe A. Gonzales, Petitioner,
v.
Industrial Commission of
the State of Colorado, and
Monfort of Colorado, Inc.,
Respondents.
No. 85SC182.
740 P.2d 999
Supreme
Court of Colorado,
En Banc.
July 27, 1987.
Hornbein, MacDonald, Fattor and Buckley, P.C., Philip Hornbein,
Jr., Denver, for petitioner.
Duane Woodard, Atty. Gen., Charles B. Howe, Chief Deputy Atty.
Gen., Richard H. Forman, Sol. Gen., Christa D. Taylor, Asst. Atty.
Gen., Denver, for respondent Industrial Com'n.
Holland & Hart, John M. Husband, James J. Gonzales, Denver, for
respondent Monfort of Colo., Inc.
KIRSHBAUM, Justice.
In Gonzales v. Industrial Commission, No. 84CA0804 (Colo.App.
Mar. 14, 1985), an unpublished decision, the Court of Appeals
affirmed an order of the Industrial Commission (the Commission)
disqualifying the petitioner, Joe A. Gonzales (Gonzales), from the
receipt of unemployment compensation benefits. The Court of Appeals
concluded that, because Gonzales had been discharged pursuant to
certain disciplinary guidelines established by his employer, the
Commission properly refused to consider other circumstances relevant
to Gonzales' discharge. We granted certiorari to review this
conclusion, and now reverse and remand with directions.
I
From April 1982 until December 1983, Gonzales was employed by
Monfort of Colorado, Inc. (Monfort) as a processing laborer at
Monfort's Greeley meatpacking plant. Gonzales was issued a copy of
the Monfort Information Handbook, which contained a detailed
explanation of the company's five-step disciplinary program
governing dismissal of employees without regard to fault. Any
employee who reached Step Five as the result of accumulated
disciplinary action was automatically discharged. In this regard,
the handbook provided the following pertinent information:
[W]e have developed a NO FAULT absentee
program under which all except specific Absence Occurrences
listed below will be counted as Absence Occurrences
REGARDLESS OF THE REASON FOR ABSENCE....
If you have two (2) or more Absence
Occurrences during any thirty (30) calendar day period you
may be considered to have been absent excessively....
An employee who has two (2) ABSENCE
OCCURRENCES during any thirty (30) calendar day period will
be charged with a step in the [five-step disciplinary]
program, which will move that employee to the next step of
the procedure.
Specifically exempted from disciplinary
action were absences involving workers' compensation injury,
vacation, jury duty, paid funeral leave, military leave or
leave of absence approved in writing and in advance by a
supervisor.
Between July 11 and December 23, 1983, Gonzales was
disciplined on five separate occasions: twice for absenteeism, once
for failure to follow instructions, once for failure to perform the
quantity and quality of work expected and once for failure to
telephone the job site thirty minutes prior to starting time when
unavailable for work due to illness. Upon receiving the fifth
disciplinary action, he was discharged from employment.
Gonzales applied for unemployment compensation benefits. Monfort
filed a protest, asserting that Gonzales had been discharged because
of excessive absenteeism and because he had exhausted all five steps
of the company's disciplinary program. The Deputy of the Division of
Employment and Training concluded that Gonzales was responsible for
the separation and, pursuant to section 8-73-108(9)(a)(XX), 3 C.R.S.
(1983 Supp.) (now codified at Sec. 8-73-108(5)(e)(XX), 3B C.R.S.
(1986)), denied benefits.
Gonzales appealed, and a hearing was conducted by a Commission
referee. The evidence at the hearing revealed several additional
circumstances surrounding Gonzales' discharge. The initial
discipline was imposed because Gonzales incurred two absences within
a thirty-day period, specifically on June 15 and July 8, 1983.
Shortly after undertaking a new work assignment processing meat on a
moving conveyor belt in early August 1983, Gonzales received a
second discipline for failure to follow instructions and a third
discipline for failure to perform the quantity and quality of work
expected. Gonzales' work performance improved, however, and his work
was later complimented by a supervisor. The Step Four discipline was
imposed on October 11, 1983, for failure to telephone Monfort at
least thirty minutes prior to starting time when too ill to work.
The final discipline was imposed when Gonzales was again absent
twice within a thirty-day period during December 1983. The evidence
also established that Monfort officials counseled Gonzales after
both the third and fourth disciplinary sanctions and informed him
that his employment would be terminated if he received a Step Five
discipline.
Gonzales testified that he was physically unable to perform the
quantity and quality of work expected of him when he was transferred
to work on the conveyor belt in August 1983; that he was unable to
notify his employer of his unavailability for work one-half hour
prior to his starting time on October 11, 1983, due to
gastrointestinal illness, but did telephone at the first practicable
time, approximately fifteen or twenty minutes before starting time;
and that he was absent from work in December 1983 due to car trouble
beyond his control. The Commission referee concluded that although
several of the disciplinary steps imposed on Gonzales under
Monfort's process were "questionable," questions about whether any
of the steps were unjustified were irrelevant. Accordingly, the
referee affirmed the Deputy's decision. The Commission adopted the
referee's findings of fact and conclusions of law. In affirming the
Commission's order, the Court of Appeals concluded that the evidence
established that Monfort properly followed its five-step
disciplinary process and also established that Gonzales was
discharged for excessive absenteeism.
II
Monfort argues that a final order of the Commission may be
reversed only where the evidence is insufficient to support the
determination and that the Commission properly relied on Monfort's
disciplinary guidelines in concluding that Gonzales should be
disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation benefits. We
disagree.
A
It is true, of course, that the Commission's findings of fact may
not be altered on review where supported by substantial evidence.
Sims v. Industrial Comm'n, 627 P.2d 1107 (Colo.1981); Mohawk
Data Sciences Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 660 P.2d 922
(Colo.App.1983); Sec. 8-74-107(4), 3B C.R.S. (1986). However,
section 8-74-107(6), 3B C.R.S. (1986), provides expressly that an
Industrial Commission decision must be set aside if the findings of
fact do not support the decision or if the decision is erroneous as
a matter of law. Thus, a reviewing court may also consider such
issues as whether the Commission applied improper principles of law
in reaching its decision and whether the Commission's findings
support its decision. See, e.g., Andersen v. Industrial Comm'n,
167 Colo. 281, 447 P.2d 221 (1968); Mountain States Tel. & Tel.
Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 637 P.2d 401 (Colo.App.1981). These
inquiries are not forestalled simply because substantial evidence in
the record supports the Commission's findings. Andersen v.
Industrial Comm'n, 167 Colo. 281, 447 P.2d 221; Sec.
8-74-107(6).
B
Monfort asserts that when an employer establishes guidelines for
determining when an employee's conduct requires discharge, an
employee's discharge pursuant to those guidelines should prohibit
any award of unemployment compensation benefits to that employee.
However, the determination of eligibility for unemployment
compensation benefits and of standards of disqualification are
matters within the province of the General Assembly. Pierce v.
Industrial Comm'n, 195 Colo. 10, 576 P.2d 1012 (1978); Miller
v. Industrial Comm'n, 173 Colo. 476, 480 P.2d 565 (1971).
Private parties may not by agreement or rule render ineffectual the
rules and standards provided by statute. E.g., Hagenbuch v.
Plainwell Paper Co., 153 Mich.App. 834, 396 N.W.2d 556 (1986);
O'Keefe v. Tabitha, Inc., 224 Neb. 574, 399 N.W.2d 798
(1987). The Colorado Employment Security Act establishes the
Commission and delegates to that administrative agency the
responsibility of applying the standards adopted by the General
Assembly to determine whether under all the circumstances of the
case a particular separation from employment shall result in an
award of benefits. Pierce v. Industrial Comm'n, 195 Colo. 10,
576 P.2d 1012; Sec. 8-73-108(4), 3B C.R.S. (1986). Furthermore, the
provisions of the act are to be interpreted liberally in favor of
the employee. F.R. Orr Constr. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 188
Colo. 173, 534 P.2d 785 (1975); Harding v. Industrial Comm'n,
183 Colo. 52, 515 P.2d 95 (1973); Stern v. Industrial Comm'n,
667 P.2d 244 (Colo.App.1983).
Whether an employee's conduct should disqualify the employee from
receiving unemployment compensation benefits is an issue quite
distinct from the question of whether the employee was discharged in
accordance with particular employer-generated guidelines.
Industrial Comm'n v. Moffat County School Dist., 732 P.2d 616
(Colo.1987); accord, e.g., Causin v. Blache, 498 So.2d 101
(La.Ct.App.1986); Deering v. Unitog Rental Services, 381
N.W.2d 486 (Minn.Ct.App.1986). It has been widely recognized that a
violation of an employer's disciplinary rule does not per se require
denial of unemployment benefits. See, e.g., Industrial Comm'n v.
Moffat County School Dist., 732 P.2d 616 (schoolteacher who has
been dismissed is not necessarily precluded from receiving
benefits); Escamilla v. Industrial Comm'n, 670 P.2d 815
(Colo.App.1983) (where employer discharged claimant for fighting
after warning not to engage in fighting, no disqualification from
benefits because claimant acted only to protect himself against
unprovoked assault by co-employee); Mountain States Tel. & Tel.
Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 637 P.2d 401 (Colo.App.1981) (where
employer discharged claimant for accruing absences in excess of
employer's attendance guidelines, no disqualification from benefits
where absences due to incidental illness); accord, e.g., Henry v.
Iowa Dep't of Job Serv., 391 N.W.2d 731 (Iowa App.1986)
(dismissal from employment does not necessarily require denial of
benefits); Claim of Sunderland, 121 A.D.2d 779, 503 N.Y.S.2d
191 (1986) (dismissal for noncompliance with employer's attendance
policy does not invariably warrant denial of unemployment benefits);
Williams v. Burlington Industries, Inc., 318 N.C. 441, 349
S.E.2d 842 (1986) (violation of employer's guideline will not per se
disqualify claimant from benefits if claimant's actions were
objectively reasonable and taken with good cause); Gillespie v.
Commonwealth, 523 A.2d 1205 (Pa.Commw.Ct.1987) (unemployment
compensation board cannot merely rely on employer's "no fault"
attendance policy to dispose of claim for benefits, but must look to
whether claimant was justified in absences). Such a violation is but
one factor to be considered in the determination of whether a
particular employee is entitled to benefits.
The Commission relied on section 8-73-108(9)(a), 3 C.R.S. (1983
Supp.) (now codified at Sec. 8-73-108(5)(e), 3B C.R.S. (1986)), in
disqualifying Gonzales from receipt of benefits. The statute
provides in pertinent part as follows:
(e) Subject to the maximum reduction
consistent with federal law ... if a separation from
employment occurs for any of the following reasons, the
employer from whom such separation occurred shall not be
charged for benefits which are attributable to such
employment and, because any payment of benefits which are
attributable to such employment out of the fund as defined
in section 8-70-103(13) shall be deemed to have an adverse
effect on such employer's account in such fund, no payment
of such benefits shall be made from such fund:....
(XX) For other reasons including, but not
limited to, excessive tardiness or absenteeism, sleeping or
loafing on the job, or failure to meet established job
performance or other defined standards, unless such failure
is attributable to factors listed in paragraph (b) of
subsection (4) of this section....
The fundamental guide to statutory interpretation is legislative
intent. People v. District Court, 711 P.2d 666 (Colo.1985);
People v. Mascarenas, 706 P.2d 404 (Colo.1985). This court
must give effect to that intent when construing a statute. People
v. District Court, 713 P.2d 918 (Colo.1986); Ingram v. Cooper,
698 P.2d 1314 (Colo.1985); Stephen v. City & County of Denver,
659 P.2d 666 (Colo.1983). Section 8-73-108, 3B C.R.S. (1986),
specifically provides in pertinent part:
Benefit awards. (1)(a) In the granting of
benefit awards, it is the intent of the general assembly
that the division at all times be guided by the principle
that unemployment insurance is for the benefit of persons
unemployed through no fault of their own; and that each
eligible individual who is unemployed through no fault of
his own shall be entitled to receive a full award of
benefits....
The disqualification provision of section 8-73-108(5)(e) must be
read in light of this express legislative intent to provide benefits
to those who become unemployed through no fault of their own.
Sims v. Industrial Comm'n, 627 P.2d 1107 (Colo.1981); see Sec.
8-70-102, 3B C.R.S. (1986). Our Court of Appeals has frequently
recognized that under the terms of particular disqualification
provisions disqualification is inappropriate if the totality of the
circumstances establishes that a claimant was unemployed through no
fault of his own. Frontier Airlines, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n,
719 P.2d 739 (Colo.App.1986); Zelingers v. Industrial Comm'n,
679 P.2d 608 (Colo.App.1984); Hospital Shared Services of Colo.
v. Industrial Comm'n, 677 P.2d 447 (Colo.App.1984). At a
minimum, the claimant must have performed some volitional act or
have exercised some control over the circumstances resulting in the
discharge from employment. Rulon v. Industrial Comm'n, 728
P.2d 739 (Colo.App.1986); Zelingers v. Industrial Comm'n, 679
P.2d 608; Escamilla v. Industrial Comm'n, 670 P.2d 815.
Here, Gonzales was dismissed solely because he had received five
disciplines in Monfort's five-step disciplinary program. Two of
those disciplinary steps, including the fifth one that precipitated
his dismissal, were imposed under a "no-fault" policy that by its
very definition prohibits any consideration of whether the absences
were justified or unavoidable. While such a policy may form an
appropriate basis for discharge from employment, because it
insulates the employee's conduct and the circumstances surrounding
such conduct from scrutiny, it cannot serve as a rule of law
automatically disqualifying the discharged employee from statutory
benefits to which, upon careful consideration, he or she might be
entitled. Furthermore, adoption of such an approach would in effect
grant employers ultimate authority to determine that some claimants
automatically should not receive unemployment compensation
benefits--a decision that is committed to the discretion of the
Commission and that must be exercised independently in each case
under the guidelines established by the General Assembly.
In determining whether the claimant is responsible for the
separation from employment, the Commission must consider a variety
of factors. Sec. 8-73-108(4), 3B C.R.S. (1986). Included among these
factors are failure to meet quantity and quality performance
standards, Sec. 8-73-108(4)(j), 3B C.R.S. (1986) (claimant may be
entitled to full award where physically or mentally unable to
perform the work), and failure to timely notify the employer of an
illness, Sec. 8-73-108(4)(b)(II), 3B C.R.S. (1986) (failure to
notify employer of illness or emergency prior to absence will not
necessarily preclude award of benefits).
In concluding that satisfaction of Monfort's discharge program
automatically constituted fault by Gonzales, the Commission failed
to apply the correct statutory criteria and, accordingly, did not
exercise its discretion appropriately in this case. On remand, such
evidentiary matters as the "no-fault" characteristic of Monfort's
plan and the circumstances surrounding all of Gonzales' conduct
warrant careful consideration in the determination of whether
Gonzales was unemployed through no fault of his own.
C
There is a presumption that the General Assembly intends a just
and reasonable result in enacting a statute, and a statutory
construction that leads to an unreasonable result will not be
applied. Ingram v. Cooper, 698 P.2d 1314 (Colo.1985);
Allen v. Charnes, 674 P.2d 378 (Colo.1984). Statutory terms
should be given their plain, generally accepted meaning. People
v. District Court, 713 P.2d 918 (Colo.1986); Trinity
Universal Ins. Co. v. Hall, 690 P.2d 227 (Colo.1984); Clark
v. Town of Estes Park, 686 P.2d 777 (Colo.1984). Monfort
concedes that in determining whether a particular claimant's
absences are excessive under section 8-73-108(5)(e)(XX) the
Commission must apply the reasonable and ordinary meaning of the
term "excessive." Because the Commission automatically accepted the
employer's definition of excessive absenteeism, the Commission must
also determine on remand whether the four absences incurred by
Gonzales in his approximately twenty months of employment
constituted excessive absenteeism within the reasonable and ordinary
meaning of the term "excessive." See, e.g., Stevenson v.
Industrial Comm'n, 705 P.2d 1020 (Colo.App.1985) (unemployment
benefits may not be denied on basis of excessive absenteeism where
dismissal results from single unauthorized absence from work).
III
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the Court of Appeals with directions to return the case
to the Industrial Claim Appeals Office (formerly the Commission) for
further proceedings consistent with the views expressed in this
opinion.
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