Linnie Jennings, Petitioner,
v.
Industrial Commission of
the State of Colorado (Ex-Officio
Unemployment Compensation Commission of Colorado), Colorado
Division of Employment and
Training and the Salvation Army,
Respondents.
No. 83CA0274.
682 P.2d 518
Colorado
Court of Appeals,
Div. IV.
May 17, 1984.
William E. Benjamin, Boulder, for petitioner.
Duane Woodard, Atty. Gen., Charles B. Howe, Chief Deputy Atty.
Gen., Richard H. Forman, Sol. Gen., Robert Lehnert, Asst. Atty.
Gen., Denver, for respondents Indus. Com'n and Colorado Div. of
Employment and Training.
Sherman & Howard, Mary Volk Gregory, Denver, for respondent The
Salvation Army.
COYTE, Judge.*
Linnie Jennings (claimant) seeks review of a final order of the
Industrial Commission denying her unemployment benefits pursuant to
Sec. 8-73-108(9)(a)(I), C.R.S.1973 (1983 Cum.Supp.) (quitting
because of dissatisfaction with working conditions). We affirm the
order.
Claimant was employed by the Salvation Army (employer) as a
social worker in November 1980. She counseled indigents experiencing
social problems. The Salvation Army has waived its claim of
statutory exemption. Thus, her claim will be decided on the
substantive issue presented.
The evidence reveals that in November 1981 claimant noticed a
sharp increase in the number of clients requiring services, and she
was required to deal with more clients suffering from serious mental
disturbances. This increased case load resulted in more altercations
between clients present to be interviewed. Claimant testified that
she quit her job in June 1982 because of the "change in working
conditions" caused by the increased caseload.
The employer's witness admitted that claimant's caseload had
increased. However, he stated that conditions were the same for the
employer's other social worker. He also stated that claimant was
given a 10 percent raise in January 1982.
The Commission found that claimant did not quit until seven
months after she noticed the increased caseload and that conditions
were the same for the other social worker; therefore, it applied
Sec. 8-73-108(9)(a)(I).
Citing Industrial Commission v. McIntyre, 162 Colo. 227,
425 P.2d 279 (1967), claimant contends that the Commission erred in
applying Sec. 8-73-108(9)(a)(I) because her termination followed a
substantial change in working conditions. Claimant argues that she
is entitled to a full award of benefits under Sec. 8-73-108(4)(d),
C.R.S. 1973 (1983 Cum.Supp.). We reject these contentions.
McIntyre does preclude application of Sec. 8-73-108(9)(a)(I)
when termination follows a substantial change in duties or work
environment. Martinez v. Industrial Commission, 657 P.2d 457
(Colo.App.1982). However, McIntyre does not preclude an
employee from acquiescing in changes, thereby establishing new
"standard working conditions," and it does bar benefits if a
claimant quits because of dissatisfaction with standard working
conditions or regularly assigned duties.
Here, the Commission implicitly found that claimant had
acquiesced in the increased caseload. Thus, by June 1982, the
increased caseload was a standard working condition. This conclusion
was supported by evidence that claimant worked for seven months
after she noticed the increase and accepted an intervening pay
raise.
The Commission's application of Sec. 8-73-108(9)(a)(I) is
supported by substantial evidence in the record, and thus, it may
not be disturbed on review. Sims v. Industrial Commission,
627 P.2d 1107 (Colo.1981).
Order affirmed.
Enoch, C.J., and Lee*, J., concur.
* Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions
of the Colo. Const., Art. VI, Sec. 5(3), and Sec. 24-51-607(5), C.R.S. (1982 Repl.Vol. 10).
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