David J. Paul, Petitioner,
v.
Industrial Commission of
the State of Colorado and
F. A. Heckendorf, Inc.,
Respondents.
No. 80CA0737.
632 P.2d 638
Colorado
Court of Appeals,
Div. III.
May 14, 1981.
Rehearing Denied June 11,
1981.
Geoffrey deWolfe, Carol Glowinsky, Colorado Springs, for
petitioner.
J. D. MacFarlane, Atty. Gen., Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy Atty.
Gen., Mary J. Mullarkey, Sol. Gen., David L. Lavinder, Asst. Atty.
Gen., Denver, for respondents.
KIRSHBAUM, Judge.
Unemployment compensation claimant, David J. Paul, seeks review
of a final order of the Industrial Commission requiring him to repay
previously awarded benefits. We affirm.
Having been discharged from employment, claimant filed a claim
for unemployment compensation benefits in August 1979. On September
10, 1979, claimant was awarded benefits in the amount of $81 per
week by a deputy. The employer appealed, and a hearing before a
referee was scheduled October 15, 1979. Claimant's notice of that
hearing contained the following statement:
"A hearing ... is conducted to determine
why the employee was separated from his job and whether he
is entitled to, or is qualified for benefits. All issues and
factual matters affecting claimant's eligibility and
qualifications for benefits will be heard...."
The notice also advised claimant that he might confer with his
local employment office if he did not understand the law and his
rights respecting the appeal from the deputy's ruling.
On the basis of the evidence adduced at the October 15, 1979,
hearing, the referee modified the deputy's award, concluding that
claimant was disqualified from receiving benefits for 14 weeks.
Claimant did not appeal that ruling.
On November 5, 1979, claimant received a notice from the
Commission that he had been overpaid in the amount of $567 in
unemployment benefits. After a hearing and other proceedings not
here relevant, the Commission determined that claimant had been
overpaid in that amount, that claimant did owe the Commission that
sum, and that repayment should be made as an offset against future
benefits to which claimant might be entitled.
Claimant contends that the provisions of 42 U.S.C.
§ 503(a)(1) prohibit any offset against
future benefits to be assessed against a claimant who is not at
fault in creating an overpayment of benefits. We disagree.
42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(1) requires state
unemployment compensation programs to "be reasonably calculated to
insure full payment of unemployment compensation when due ...." The
statute provides a means to insure prompt payments in lieu of wages
to eligible individuals who become unemployed through no fault of
their own. California Department of Human Resources v. Java,
402 U.S. 121, 91 S.Ct. 1347, 28 L.Ed.2d 666 (1971). Colorado's
unemployment compensation statutes are intended to further the same
goals. Section 8-74-109(1), C.R.S. 1973 (1980 Cum.Supp.).
Nothing in the language of the federal statute nor its stated
purposes suggests that Congress intended to provide a permanent
windfall to individuals who receive initial benefits to which, it is
later determined, they are not entitled. Colorado's statutory
program of authorizing immediate payment of unemployment
compensation benefits prior to any formal hearing and permitting
repayment of sums subsequently found to have been improperly
advanced in the form of offsets against future awards furthers the
policies of ensuring fair treatment for the unemployed which
underlie the provisions of the federal act. See Cardenas v.
Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 36
Pa.Cmwlth. 543, 388 A.2d 765 (1978).
Claimant also argues that the notice he received respecting the
referee's hearing was fatally defective and violative of due process
of law because it did not specifically inform him that he might be
required to repay his previously awarded benefits. We again
disagree.
The General Assembly has provided specifically for the recovery
of benefits by the Commission when the benefits are paid in error.
Sections 8-74-109(2), 8-81-101(4), C.R.S. 1973 (1980 Cum.Supp.).
Claimant, having requested benefits pursuant to the unemployment
compensation statutes, must be presumed to have knowledge of the
contents of that statute. See Jensen v. Jensen, 92
Colo. 169, 18 P.2d 1016 (1933); Pomeranz v. Class, 82 Colo.
173, 257 P. 1086 (1927).
Claimant concedes that the notice he received advised him of a
possible disqualification and a potential loss of unemployment
benefits. Such warnings were sufficient to put claimant on
reasonable notice that his previously awarded benefits might be
forfeited. See Tucker v. Caldwell, 608 F.2d 140 (5th Cir.
1979). We conclude that an express warning of the results of such
adverse determinations was not constitutionally required.
Order affirmed.
Berman and Kelly, JJ., concur.
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