v.
Michael H. Ingle and the
Industrial Claim Appeals Office of
the State of Colorado,
Respondents.
No. 89CA1637.
Div. II.
June 14, 1990.
Kelly, Stansfield & O'Donnell, Marla S. Petrini, Denver, for
petitioner.
Duane Woodard, Atty. Gen., Charles B. Howe, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen.,
Richard H. Forman, Sol. Gen., Carolyn A. Boyd, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver,
for respondent Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
No appearance for respondent Michael H. Ingle.
SMITH, Judge.
Public Service Company, employer, seeks review of a final order of
the Industrial Claim Appeals Office (Panel) which awarded unemployment
compensation benefits to claimant, Michael H. Ingle. We set aside the
order of the Panel and remand.
Claimant worked for employer as a computer operator. Management
initially placed claimant on the day shift, but later told him he was
being transferred to the night shift for cross-training purposes.
Claimant told his supervisor that he did not believe he could work the
night shift and sleep days because he had a sleep disorder. Management
requested written medical verification of claimant's medical condition.
Claimant decided not to provide the verification, but instead attempted
to work the night shift. He so advised management.
Claimant worked the night shift for about two weeks, during which
time his work performance was affected because he had trouble sleeping.
Claimant tendered verbal and written resignations, citing his medical
problems as the reason for his resignation. Employer did not request
written medical substantiation of claimant's assertion that he was
quitting for medical reasons.
The hearing officer found that claimant quit his job for health
reasons and that employer was fully informed of these reasons when
claimant quit. The hearing officer then concluded that claimant's state
of health required him to seek a different kind of work.
The hearing officer also found that, once employer accepted
claimant's decision to work the night shift and did not request written
verification of claimant's medical condition again when claimant quit,
employer waived, in essence, any request it had made that claimant
provide written verification of his medical condition. Accordingly, the
hearing officer granted claimant benefits pursuant to Sec. 8-73-108(4)(b)(I),
C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 3B). The Panel affirmed.
I.
Employer contends that the Panel erred as a matter of law in
interpreting the phrase "new occupation" and in awarding claimant
benefits pursuant to Sec. 8-73-108(4)(b)(I). We agree.
Section 8-73-108(4)(b)(I) provides for an award of benefits if a
worker's health is such that he "must seek a new occupation." (emphasis
supplied)
In affirming, the Panel noted it applied a very broad definition of
"occupation." The Panel concluded that the requirement that claimant
seek a "new occupation" was satisfied when the health of the worker
prevented him from continuing in a specific job because of the
conditions of that particular employment, even though the claimant could
continue in the same line of work. Under the Panel's interpretation,
then, a claimant would satisfy the requirement of seeking a "new
occupation" if he simply had to seek a new job because of work-related
health reasons. This would be true even if the new job were in the same
line of work as the job he quit.
Employer argues, however, that claimant's health did not prevent him
from seeking and performing the same type of work he had been performing
as a computer operator under different employment conditions. Therefore,
employer asserts, claimant was not required to seek a "new occupation"
and benefits were improperly awarded.
The primary task in construing a statute is to ascertain the intent
of the General Assembly. People v. Beyer, 768 P.2d 746
(Colo.App.1988). To do so, we must consider the statute as a whole,
construe the entire act to give consistent, harmonious, and sensible
effect to all its parts, and consider the ends the statute is designed
to accomplish. See Redin v. Empire Oldsmobile, Inc., 746 P.2d 52
(Colo.App.1987).
In ascertaining the legislative intent, meaning is to be given to
every word, phrase, clause, sentence, and section, if possible. Denver v. Taylor, 88 Colo. 89, 292 P. 594 (1930). Further, in
determining the meaning of the word "occupation," we must give effect to
its plain and ordinary meaning and avoid strained interpretations. See Cache La Poudre Reservoir Co. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Panel,
757 P.2d 173 (Colo.App.1988).
Upon consideration of these principles, we conclude the Panel
misinterpreted the phrase "new occupation" as it is used in Sec.
8-73-108(4)(b)(I). We conclude that "occupation," in its plain and
ordinary meaning, generally refers to the particular type of business,
profession, or employment in which a worker regularly engages, i.e., the
particular type of work a worker performs. It has no relationship to
specific employers. Thus, a worker could be engaged in an occupation as
a doctor, computer operator, plumber, electrician, secretary, bus
driver, etc., either on his or her own or for any employer who employs a
person who performs that type of work.
On the other hand, "employment," "job," or "work" usually connotes a
particular position held by an individual at a particular place of work
at a given time. Therefore, "occupation," has a different meaning than
"job," "employment," and "work," as it is used in the statutory sections
relating to qualifications for unemployment compensation.
That the General Assembly intended such a result is supported by a
review of the specific statutory sections involved here.
Pursuant to Sec. 8-73-108(4)(b)(I), a claimant may be awarded
benefits when his termination is health related under three general
categories: (1) the health of the worker requires him to be separated
from his employment for a period of time; (2) the worker's health
requires him to seek a new occupation; or (3) the health of the worker,
his spouse, or his dependent child requires him to leave the vicinity of
his employment. Thus, by this provision, the General Assembly twice
premised an award of benefits on a claimant's having been separated from
his employment and once on a claimant's having been required to seek a
new occupation.
By its choice of words, the General Assembly has indicated its
intention to differentiate between "employment" and "occupation."
See
State v. Borquez, 751 P.2d 639 (Colo.1988). Consequently, we
conclude that the General Assembly intended that a claimant be required
to seek a new "occupation" or line of work, and not just new employment,
in order to be eligible for benefits under the second condition of Sec.
8-73-108(4)(b)(I). Hence, the Panel erred in granting claimant an award
of benefits pursuant to this section.
II.
Although an award of benefits premised on the "new occupation"
portion of the statute was improper, claimant could be entitled to
benefits if his sleep disorder caused him to be unable to continue his
job. Employer, however, contends that claimant has not satisfied the
requirements of the statute for such eligibility because he did not
provide a written medical statement substantiating that he was quitting
because of his health condition. We reject employer's contention.
Pursuant to Sec. 8-73-108(4)(b)(I), a claimant who quits for health
reasons must inform his employer of the condition of his health prior to
his separation from employment and substantiate the cause by a competent
written medical statement issued prior to his separation if so requested
by his employer prior to his separation or within a reasonable time
thereafter.
Employer contends that because it requested a medical statement from
claimant when he asked not to be transferred to the night shift because
of health reasons, and claimant refused to provide any medical
documentation at that time, it was not required to ask for medical
substantiation again when claimant resigned, citing the same health
reasons. It argues that it was entitled to assume claimant would again
refuse to provide the documentation. Therefore, employer concludes that
claimant failed to comply with the statutory requirement of providing
written substantiation of his medical condition when so requested by
employer. We disagree.
We construe Sec. 8-73-108(4)(b)(I) to require an employer to request
a claimant to provide competent written medical substantiation that
health reasons are the cause of his separation from employment after the
claimant informs the employer that he is resigning for health reasons.
Here, the employer did request a medical statement when the claimant
objected to the transfer to the night shift, but the employer did not
request a statement to "substantiate the cause" of his resignation when
claimant subsequently notified the employer several weeks later that he
was quitting because of his health condition. Consequently, since
employer failed to request written substantiation as is required by the
statute, claimant is not precluded from being entitled to unemployment
benefits by virtue of not having provided the written medical statement
concerning the reasons for his resignation.
The order of the Panel is set aside, and the cause is remanded to the
Panel for re-consideration under the more appropriate statutory
provisions referred to herein.
Metzger and Plank, JJ., concur.
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