Bettye Stevenson, Petitioner,
v.
Industrial Commission of
Colorado, and Lois V. Michopoulos, Inc.,
d/b/a Michelles,
Respondents.
No. 84CA0608.
705 P.2d 1020
Colorado
Court of Appeals,
Div. I.
April 25, 1985.
Pikes Peak Legal Services, R. Eric Solem, Colorado Springs, for
petitioner.
Duane Woodard, Atty. Gen., Charles B. Howe, Chief Deputy Atty.
Gen., Richard H. Forman, Sol. Gen., Christa Taylor, Asst. Atty.
Gen., Denver, for respondent Industrial Commission.
No appearance for respondent Michopoulos, Inc., d/b/a Michelles.
PIERCE, Judge.
Claimant, Bettye Stevenson, seeks review of a final order of the
Industrial Commission awarding her reduced unemployment compensation
benefits pursuant to Sec. 8-73-108(9)(a)(XX), C.R.S., then in effect
(now found at Sec. 8-73-108(5)(e)(XX), C.R.S. (1984 Cum.Supp.)).
Although the Commission applied the wrong statutory subsection, we
nevertheless affirm the order.
Claimant was terminated from her position as a cook for
Michelle's restaurant (the employer) after she refused to provide
the employer with written verification of a trip to the hospital
emergency room after an unexcused absence. She stated that she
refused to submit the verification because the employer had not
required it from other employees.
The hearing officer determined from conflicting evidence that the
employer had a rule requiring such verification, and found that the
employer's request for verification was reasonable. The Commission
ordered a maximum reduction in benefits pursuant to Sec.
8-73-108(9)(a)(XX), C.R.S.
Claimant contends that that statutory section does not permit the
Industrial Commission to deny unemployment benefits when termination
results from a single unauthorized absence from work. We agree.
The statutory provision at issue provides for a maximum reduction
of unemployment compensation benefits if termination results "[f]or
other reasons including ... excessive tardiness or absenteeism ...
or failure to meet established job performance or other defined
standards...."
The facts of this case do not apply to that portion of the
statute. It is obvious, however, that the Commission's findings
apply directly to the statutory section now codified as Sec.
8-73-108(5)(e)(VI), C.R.S. (1984 Cum.Supp.), which allows maximum
reduction for "[i]nsubordination such as: [d]eliberate disobedience
of a reasonable instruction of an employer or his duly authorized
representative...."
To return this case to the Commission for reconsideration under
the proper section would be wasteful of time, both the Commission's
and ours, because the conclusion it would have to reach under its
factual findings is foregone. It has reached the proper legal
conclusion under the wrong section of the statute.
The order is, therefore, affirmed.
Smith and Babcock, JJ., concur.