Janice E. Warburton, Petitioner,
v.
Industrial Commission of
the State of Colorado (Ex-Officio
Unemployment Compensation Commission of Colorado); Mike L.
Baca,
Commissioner; Gary B. Rose, Commissioner; John J.
McDonald,
Commissioner; Colorado Department of Labor;
Division
of Labor and Employment, Division of Labor;
Division
of Employment and Training; Ruben Valdez,
Director
of the Division of Employment and Training of
the State of
Colorado; National Jewish Hospital at
Denver (Employer); and Employers
Unity
(Employer Representative), Respondents.
No. 83CA1000.
678 P.2d 1076
Colorado
Court of Appeals,
Div. II.
March 1, 1984.
Janice E. Warburton, pro se.
Duane Woodard, Atty. Gen., Charles B. Howe, Chief Deputy Atty.
Gen., Richard H. Forman, Sol. Gen., Lynn Palma, Asst. Atty. Gen.,
Denver, for respondents.
BERMAN, Judge.
Claimant, Janice E. Warburton, seeks review of a final order of
the Industrial Commission denying her unemployment compensation
benefits. We set aside the order.
Claimant was employed as a "coordinator of special therapies" for
National Jewish Hospital (employer). Before she left on maternity
leave she provided about eight hours of direct patient services per
week and spent the rest of her time on planning and administration,
including supervising two therapists. A few months before her return
from leave she met with her supervisor who informed her that some
changes had occurred in her absence. It was undisputed that
claimant's direct service time was to be increased and her
administrative duties cut proportionally; one of the therapists
under her supervision had been transferred to another department and
the other therapist was to participate in coordination and planning.
The employer's representative testified that claimant's
administrative duties would be cut by approximately seven hours per
week, while claimant stated that the cut would be greater. However,
claimant's salary and title were to remain the same. Shortly before
claimant was scheduled to return from leave, she submitted a letter
of resignation. She stated that she was resigning because she
considered the changes to be a demotion.
The deputy awarded claimant full benefits pursuant to Sec.
8-73-108(4)(c), C.R.S. (1982 Cum.Supp.) (unsatisfactory working
conditions), finding that the changed duties did not utilize
claimant's experience and training. The referee reversed, finding on
conflicting evidence that claimant's working conditions utilized her
experience and training, were not unsatisfactory, and that the
change did not result in working conditions substantially less
favorable to claimant. He concluded that claimant quit for personal
reasons and denied benefits pursuant to Sec. 8-73-108(8), C.R.S.
(1982 Cum.Supp.). The Industrial Commission adopted and affirmed the
findings and conclusions of the referee.
Claimant seeks review, contending that the facts support the
application of Sec. 8-73-108(4)(d), C.R.S. (1982 Cum.Supp.). We
agree.
Section 8-73-108(4)(d) provides for a full award of benefits if a
claimant resigns because of a substantial change in working
conditions, where those conditions become substantially less
favorable to the claimant. A substantial change occurs if a claimant
is relieved of supervisory and administrative responsibilities, even
if the claimant's salary remains the same. Martinez v. Industrial
Commission, 657 P.2d 457 (Colo.App.1982). We find the reasoning
of Martinez to be persuasive here.
It is undisputed that claimant's administrative duties were to be
cut, and reduced even further by being shared with a former
subordinate, and that her supervisory responsibilities were cut in
half by the staff reduction in her department. Under these
circumstances, despite the fact that her job title and salary were
to remain the same, the change in claimant's working conditions
constituted a demotion, and she is therefore entitled to a full
award of unemployment benefits pursuant to Sec. 8-73-108(4)(d),
C.R.S. (1982 Cum.Supp.). See Martinez v. Industrial Commission,
supra; see also Industrial Commission v. McIntyre, 162
Colo. 227, 425 P.2d 279 (1967).
The order is set aside and the cause is remanded with directions
to award claimant full unemployment benefits.
Kelly and Babcock, JJ., concur.